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A bilevel optimization model for load balancing in mobile networks
through price incentives
Marianne Akian · Mustapha Bouhtou · Jean
Bernard Eytard · Stéphane Gaubert
Abstract We propose a model of incentives for data pricing in large mobile networks, in which an
operator wishes to balance the number of connections (active users) of different classes of users in the
different cells and at different time instants, in order to ensure them a sufficient quality of service.
We assume that each user has a given total demand per day for different types of applications,
which he may assign to different time slots and locations, depending on his own mobility, on
his preferences and on price discounts proposed by the operator. We show that this can be cast
as a bilevel programming problem with a special structure allowing us to develop a polynomial
time decomposition algorithm suitable for large networks. First, we determine the optimal number
of connections (which maximizes a measure of balance); next, we solve an inverse problem and
determine the prices generating this traffic. Our results exploit a recently developed application of
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tropical geometry methods to mixed auction problems, as well as algorithms in discrete convexity
(minimization of discrete convex functions in the sense of Murota). We finally present an application
on real data provided by Orange and we show the efficiency of the model to reduce the peaks of
congestion.
Keywords Bilevel programming · Mobile data networks · Tropical geometry · Discrete convexity ·
Graph algorithms
1 Introduction
With the development of new mobile data technologies (3G, 4G), the demand for using the In-
ternet with mobile phones has increased rapidly. Mobile service providers (MSP) have to confront
congestion problems in order to guarantee a sufficient quality of service (QoS).
Several approaches have been developed to improve the quality of service, coming from different
fields of the telecommunication engineering and economics. For instance, one can refer to Bonald
and Feuillet [5] for some models of performance analysis to optimize the network in order to im-
prove the QoS. One of the promising alternatives to solve such problems consists in using efficient
pricing schemes in order to encourage customers to shift their mobile data consumption. In [19],
Maillé and Tuffin describe a mechanism of auctions based on game-theoretic methods for pricing an
Internet network, see also [20]. In [1], Altman et al. study how to price different services by using
a noncooperative game. These different approaches are based on congestion games. In the present
work, we are interested in how a MSP can improve the QoS by balancing the traffic in the network.
We wish to determine in which locations, and at which time instants, it is relevant to propose price
incentives, and to evaluate the influence of these incentives on the quality of service.
This kind of problem belongs to smart data pricing. We refer the reader to the survey of Sen
et al. [27] and also to the collection of articles [28]. Finding efficient pricing schemes is a revenue
management issue. The first approach consists in usage-based pricing; the prices are fixed monthly
by analysing the use of the former months. It is possible to improve this scheme by identifying
peak hours and non-peak hours and proposing incentives in non-peak hours in order to decrease
the demand at peak hours and to better use the network capacity at non-peak hours. This leads
to time-dependent pricing. Such a scheme for mobile data is developed by Ha et al. in [14]. The
prices are determined at different time slots and based on the usage of the previous day in order
to maximize the utility of the customers and the revenue of the MSP. This pricing scheme was
concretely implemented by AT&T, showing the relevance of such a model. In another approach,
Tadrous et al. propose a model in which the MSP anticipates peak hours and determines incentives
for proactive downloads [29].
The latter models concern only the time aspects. One must also take into account the spatial
aspect in order to optimize the demand between the different locations. In [17], Ma, Liu and Huang
present a model depending on time and location of the customers where the MSP proposes prices
and optimizes his profit taking into account the utility of the customers.
Here, we assume (as in [17]) that the MSP proposes incentives at different time and places.
Then, customers optimize their data consumption by knowing these incentives and the MSP op-
timizes a measure of the QoS. In this way, we introduce a bilevel model in which the provider
proposes incentives in order to balance the traffic in the network and to avoid as much as possible
the congestion (high level problem), and customers optimize their own consumption for the given
incentives (low level problem).
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Bilevel programs have been widely studied, see the surveys of Colson, Marcotte and Savard [8]
and of Dempe [10]. They represent an important class of pricing problems in the sense that they
model a leader wanting to maximize his profit and proposing prices to some followers who maximize
themselves their own utility. Most classes of bilevel programs are known to be NP-hard. Several
methods have been introduced to solve such problems. For instance, if the low level program is
convex, it can be replaced by its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions and the bilevel problem
becomes a classical one-stage optimization problem, which is however generally non convex. If some
variables are binary or discrete, and the objective function is linear, the global bilevel problem can
be rewritten as a mixed integer program, as in Brotcorne et al. [6].
In the present work, we optimize the consumption of each customer in a large area (large urban
agglomeration) during typically one day divided in time slots of one hour, taking into account the
different types of customers and of applications that they use. Therefore, we have to confront both
with the difficulties inherent to bilevel programming and with the large number of variables (around
107). Hence, we need to find polynomial time algorithms, or fast approximate methods, for classes
of problems of a very large scale, which, if treated directly, would lead to mixed integer linear or
nonlinear programming formulations beyond the capacities of current off-the-shelve solvers.
This motivated us to introduce a different approach, based on tropical geometry. Tropical geom-
etry methods have been recently applied by Baldwin and Klemperer in [3] to an auction problem.
This has been further developed by Yu and Tran [30]. In these approaches, the response of an agent
to a price is represented by a certain polyhedral complex (arrangement of tropical hypersurfaces).
This approach is intuitive since it allows one to vizualize geometrically the behavior of the agents:
each cell of the complex corresponds to the set of incentives leading to a given response. Then,
we vizualize the collective response of a group of customers by “superposing” (refining) the poly-
hedral complexes attached to every customer in this group. We apply here this idea to represent
the response of the low-level optimizers in a bilevel problem. This leads to the following decom-
position method: first we compute, among all the admissible consumptions of the customers, the
one which maximizes a measure of balance of the network; then, we determine the price incentive
which achieves this consumption. In this way, a bilevel problem is reduced to the minimization of
a convex function over a certain Minkowski sum of sets. We identify situations in which the latter
problem can be solved in polynomial time, by exploiting the discrete convexity results developed
by Murota [22]. In this approach, a critical step is to check the membership of a vector to a certain
Minkowski sum of sets of integer points of polytopes. In our present model, these polytopes, which
represent the possible consumptions of one customer, have a remarkable combinatorial structure
(they are hypersimplices). Exploiting this combinatorial structure, we show that this critical step
can be performed quickly, by reduction to a shortest path problem in a graph. This leads to an
exact solution method when there is only one type of contract and one type of application sensitive
to price incentive, and to a fast approximate method in the general case.
We finally present the application of this model on real data from Orange and show how price
incentives can improve the QoS by balancing the number of active customers in an urban agglom-
eration during one day. These results indicate that a price incentive mechanism can effectively
improve the satisfaction of the users by displacing their consumption from the most loaded regions
of the space-time domain to less loaded regions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the bilevel model. In Section 3, we
explain how a certain polyhedral complex can be used to represent the user’s responses, and we
describe the decomposition method. In Section 4, we deal with the high level problem and identify
special cases which are solvable in polynomial time. In Section 5, we develop accelerated algorithms
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which enable to solve bilevel problems with a large number of customers. In Section 6, we propose
a general relaxation method. The application to the instance provided by Orange is presented in
Section 7.
The first results of this article (without proofs) were published in the proceedings of the confer-
ence WiOpt 2017 [11].
2 A bilevel model
We consider a time horizon of one day, divided in T time slots numbered t ∈ [T ] = {1, . . . T}, and
a network divided in L different cells numbered l ∈ [L]. We assume that K customers, numbered
k ∈ [K], are in the network. The customers have different types of contracts b ∈ [B] and they
make requests for different types of applications a ∈ [A] (web/mail, streaming, download, . . . ). We
denote by Kb the set of customers with the contract b. A given customer k ∈ Kb is characterized
by the following data. We denote by Lkt ∈ [L] the position of the customer k at each time t ∈ [T ],
so that the sequence (Lk1 , . . . , LkT ) represents the trajectory of this customer. We assume that this
trajectory is deterministic, so we consider customers with a regular daily mobility (for example,
the trip between home and work). We denote by ρak(t) the inclination of a customer k to make a
request for an application of type a at time t ∈ [T ]. We suppose that customer k wishes to make a
fixed number of requests Rak ≤ T using the application a during the day. We consider a set of time
slots Iak ⊂ [T ] in which the customer k decides not to consume the application a.
We denote by uak(t) the consumption of the customer k for the application a at time t, setting
uak(t) = 1 if k is active at time t and makes a request of type a and u
a
k(t) = 0 otherwise. Therefore,
the numberNa,b(t, l) of active customers with contract b for the application a at time t and location l
is given by Na,b(t, l) =
∑
k∈Kb u
a
k(t)1(L
k
t = l), where 1 denotes the indicator function, and the total
number of active customers N(t, l) at time t and location l is given by N(t, l) =
∑
a
∑
bN
a,b(t, l).
We consider the following two-stage model of price incentives. The first stage consists for the
operator in announcing a discount ya,b(t, l) at time t and location l for the customers of contract
b making requests of type a. We consider only nonnegative discounts, so ya,b(t, l) ≥ 0. The second
stage models the behavior of customers who modify their consumption by taking the discounts
into account. We will assume the preference of a customer k of contract b for consuming at time
t becomes ρak(t) + α
a
ky
a,b(t, Lkt ), where αak denotes the sensitivity of customer k to price incentives
for the application a. It corresponds to classical linear utility functions, see e.g. [3]. We also assume
that the customers cannot make more than one request at each time, that is ∀t ∈ [T ], ∑a uak(t) ≤
1. Therefore, each customer k determines his consumptions uak = (u
a
k(t))t∈[T ] ∈ {0, 1}T for the
applications, as an optimal solution of the linear program:
Problem 1 (Low-level, customers)
max
uak∈{0,1}T
∑
a∈[A]
T∑
t=1
[
ρak(t) + α
a
ky
a,b(t, Lkt )
]
uak(t) (1)
s.t. ∀a ∈ [A] ,
T∑
t=1
uak(t) = R
a
k, ∀t ∈ [T ] ,
∑
a∈[A]
uak(t) ≤ 1
∀t ∈ Iak ,∀a ∈ [A] , uak(t) = 0 .
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Consequently, each price ya,b = (ya,b(t, l))t∈[T ], l∈[L] determines the possible individual con-
sumptions uak for the users with contract b, and so the possible cumulated traffic vectors N
a,b =
(Na,b(t, l))t∈[T ], l∈[L] and N =
∑
a
∑
bN
a,b. The aim of the operator is, through price incentives, to
balance the load in the network into the different locations and time slots to improve the quality of
service perceived by each customer. We introduce a coefficient γb relative to the kind of contracts
of the different customers in order to favor some classes of premium customers. In [16], Lee et al.
suppose that the satisfaction of a customer depends on his perceived throughput, which can be con-
sidered as inversely proportional to the number of customers in the cell. Here, we assume that the
satisfaction of each customer k in the cell l ∈ [L] is a nonincreasing function sa,bl of the total number
of active customers in the cell N(t, l), depending on the characteristics of the cell, of the type of
application the user wants to do (some applications like streaming need a higher rate than others)
and on the type of contract. We also assume that the satisfaction of all the customers with contract
b using a given application a in a given cell is maximal until the number of active customers reaches
a certain threshold Na,bl , then s
a,b
l (N(t, l)) = 1 for N(t, l) ≤ Na,bl . After this threshold, the satis-
faction decreases until a critical value NCl . We add the constraint ∀t ∈ [T ] , ∀l ∈ [L] , N(t, l) ≤ NCl
to prevent the congestion. For non-real time services like web, mail, download, the satisfaction
function can be viewed as a concave function of the throughput, like 1 − e−δ/δc where δ denotes
the throughput, see Moety et al. [21]. Hence, we will consider that for contents like web, mail and
download, Na,bl = N
1
l , s
a,b
l (n) = 1 for n ≤ N1l and sa,bl (n) = 1−λb exp
(
− 2NCl
n−N1l
)
for N1l ≤ n ≤ NCl
where λb is a positive parameter depending on the kind of contract of the customer. The more ex-
pensive the contract of the customer is, the larger is λb. We can prove that this function is concave
for 0 ≤ n ≤ NCl . For real time services like video streaming, the customers need a more important
throughput to ensure a good QoS [16]. We will here consider the same type of functions sa,bl but
with N1l replaced by N
a,b
l = 0, that is s
a,b
l (n) = 1− λb exp
(
− 2NCln
)
for 0 < n ≤ NCl .
N(t, l)
sa,bl
1
0
N1l N
C
l
Fig. 1 Different kind of satisfaction functions of the number of active customers in a cell. The blue ones are those for
streaming contents whereas the red ones are those for web, mail and download contents. The dashed ones corresponds
to the satisfaction of standard customers, the continuous ones to the satisfaction of premium customers.
So, the first stage consists in maximizing the global satisfaction function s which depends on
the vectors Na,b ∈ NT×L and is defined by:
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s(Na,b) =
T∑
t=1
∑
a∈[A]
∑
b∈[B]
∑
k∈Kb
γbs
a,b
Lkt
(N(t, Lkt ))u
a
k(t)
=
T∑
t=1
∑
a∈[A]
∑
b∈[B]
∑
k∈Kb
L∑
l=1
γbs
a,b
l (N(t, l))1(L
k
t = l)u
a
k(t)
=
T∑
t=1
L∑
l=1
∑
a∈[A]
∑
b∈[B]
γbN
a,b(t, l)sa,bl (N(t, l))
with ∀b ∈ [B] , γb > 0. Our final model consists in solving the following bilevel program:
Problem 2 (High-level, provider)
max
ya,b∈RT×L+
T∑
t=1
L∑
l=1
∑
a∈[A]
∑
b∈[B]
γbN
a,b(t, l)sa,bl (N(t, l)) (2)
where ∀t ∈ [T ] , l ∈ [L] , N(t, l) =∑Aa=1∑Bb=1Na,b(t, l), and N(t, l) ≤ NCl , ∀t ∈ [T ] , l ∈ [L] , a ∈
[A] , b ∈ [B] , Na,b(t, l) = ∑k∈Kb uak(t)1(Lkt = l), and ∀k ∈ [K], the vectors uak are solutions of
Problem 1.
3 A decomposition approach for solving the first model
We will present a decomposition method for solving the previous bilevel problem. In this section,
and in the next two ones, we suppose that there is only one kind of application and one kind of con-
tract. This special case is already relevant in applications: it covers the case when, for instance, only
the download requests are influenced by price incentives, whereas other requests like streaming or
web are fixed. Whereas the analytical results of the present section carry over to the general model,
the results of the next two sections (polynomial time solvability) are only valid under these restric-
tive assumptions. We shall return to the general case in Section 6, developing a fast approximate
algorithm for the general model based on the present principles.
In the above special case, the bilevel model can be rewritten:
max
y∈RT×L+
T∑
t=1
L∑
l=1
N(t, l)sl(N(t, l))
where ∀t, l N(t, l) ≤ NCl and N(t, l) =
∑
k∈[K] u
∗
k(t)1(L
k
t = l), and for each k ∈ [K] the vectors u∗k
are solutions of the problem:
max
uk∈{0,1}T
T∑
t=1
[
ρk(t) + αky(t, L
k
t )
]
uk(t)
s.t.
T∑
t=1
uk(t) = Rk, ∀t ∈ Ik, uk(t) = 0,
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In order to deal more abstractly with the bilevel model, we introduce the notation uk(t, l) =
uk(t)1(L
k
t = l). Hence, we have uk(t, l) = 0 if Lkt 6= l. By defining the set Jk = {(t, l) | t ∈ Ik or
Lkt 6= l}, we have that (t, l) ∈ Jk implies that uk(t, l) = 0. We can then define ρk(t, l) = ρk(t)/αk if
(t, l) /∈ Jk and ρk(t, l) = −∞ otherwise. Then, we can rewrite each low-level problem as:
max
uk∈Fk
∑
t,l
[ρk(t, l) + y(t, l)]uk(t, l)
where Fk = {u ∈ {0, 1}T×L |
∑
t,l u(t, l) = Rk and ∀(t, l) ∈ Jk, u(t, l) = 0}, and the global bilevel
problem becomes:
max
y∈RT×L+
∑
t,l
fl(N(t, l)) s.t. ∀(t, l) N(t, l) ≤ NCl , N(t, l) =
K∑
k=1
uk(t, l)
with fl : x ∈ R+ 7→ xsl(x). Notice that the set Jk corresponds to the set of couples (t, l) such that
ρk(t, l) = −∞. It is possible to enumerate all the couples (t, l) ∈ [T ]× [L]. Let us define n = T × L
and associate each couple (t, l) to an integer i ∈ [n]. The quantities ρk(t, l), uk(t, l), N(t, l) and
y(t, l) can be respectively denoted by ρk(i), uk(i), Ni and yi. The function fl and the integer NCl
can be respectively denoted by fi and NCi . It means that for two indices i and j associated to two
couples (t, l) and (t′, l) with the same l, we have fi = fj := fl and NCi = NCj := NCl . The low-level
problem can be rewritten:
Problem 3 (Abstract low-level problem)
max
uk∈Fk
n∑
i=1
[ρk(i) + yi]uk(i) (3)
where Fk = {u ∈ {0, 1}n|
∑n
i=1 u(i) = Rk and ∀i ∈ Jk, u(i) = 0}.
The global bilevel problem is:
Problem 4 (Bilevel problem)
max
y∈Rn+
n∑
i=1
fi(Ni) s.t. ∀i,Ni ≤ NCi , Ni =
K∑
k=1
u∗k(i) (4)
with for all k ∈ [K], u∗k solution of Problem 3.
Lemma 1 Suppose that the functions si are nonincreasing and concave on
[
0, NCi
]
. Then, the
functions fi are also concave on
[
0, NCi
]
.
Proof. The result comes easily if we suppose that the functions si are twice differentiable, because
we have:
∀x ∈ [0, NCi ] , f ′′i (x) = xs′′i (x) + 2s′i(x) ≤ 0 .
We could deduce that the same is true without the differentiability assumption by a density
argument, writing a concave function as a pointwise limit of smooth concave functions. However,
8 Marianne Akian et al.
we prefer to provide the following elementary argument. Consider 0 ≤ x ≤ y ≤ NCi and t ∈ [0, 1].
Because si is nonincreasing, we have si(x) ≥ si(y). We have:
tfi(x) + (1− t)fi(y) = txsi(x) + (1− t)ysi(y)
= (tx+ (1− t)y)
[
tx
tx+ (1− t)y si(x) +
(1− t)y
tx+ (1− t)y si(y)
]
≤ (tx+ (1− t)y)si
(
tx2 + (1− t)y2
tx+ (1− t)y
)
Because of the well-known inequality 2xy ≤ x2 + y2, we have:
(tx+ (1− t)y)2 = t2x2 + (1− t)2y2 + 2t(1− t)xy
≤ tx2 + (1− t)y2 .
Then, because si is nonincreasing, we have:
si
(
tx2 + (1− t)y2
tx+ (1− t)y
)
≤ si(tx+ (1− t)y) ,
so that:
tfi(x) + (1− t)fi(y) ≤ (tx+ (1− t)y)si(tx+ (1− t)y) = fi(tx+ (1− t)y) ,
and fi is concave.
3.1 A tropical representation of customers’ response
The lower-level component of our bilevel problem can be studied thanks to tropical techniques.
Tropical mathematics refers to the study of the max-plus semifield Rmax, that is the set R∪ {−∞}
endowed with two laws ⊕ and  defined by a⊕ b = max(a, b) and a b = a+ b, see [2,15,7,18] for
background. We first consider the relaxation in which the price vector y can take any real value,
i.e. y ∈ Rn. Each customer k defines his consumption u∗k by solving the problem:
max
uk∈Fk
∑
i
[ρk(i) + yi]uk(i) = max
uk∈Fk
〈ρk + y, uk〉 . (5)
The map Pk : y 7→ maxuk∈Fk〈ρk + y, uk〉 is convex, piecewise affine, and the gradients of its linear
parts are integer valued. It can be thought of as a tropical polynomial function in the variable y.
Indeed, with the tropical notation, we have
Pk(y) =
⊕
uk∈Fk
⊙
i∈[n]
(ρk(i) yi)uk(i)

where zp := z  · · ·  z = p × z denotes the pth tropical power. In this way, we see that all
the monomials of Pk have degree
∑
i uk(i) = Rk, so that Pk is homogeneous of degree Rk, in the
tropical sense. This remark leads to the following lemma:
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Lemma 2 Denote by e = (1 . . . 1) ∈ Rn. Let y be a solution of the relaxation y ∈ Rn of Problem 4.
Then, for all β ∈ R, y + βe is a solution of the relaxation y ∈ Rn of Problem 4.
Proof. Consider a solution y ∈ Rn of the relaxed problem. Because Pk is homogeneous of degree
Rk, we have for all β ∈ Rn, Pk(y + βe) = Pk(y) + βRk. In particular:
u∗k ∈ arg max
uk∈Fk
〈ρk + y, uk〉 ⇔ u∗k ∈ arg max
uk∈Fk
〈ρk + y + βe, uk〉
Hence, y+βe leads to the same repartition of the customers N∗ and corresponds also to an optimal
solution of the relaxed bilevel problem.
Corollary 1 The bilevel problem 4 has the same value as its relaxation y ∈ Rn.
Proof. Consider a solution y∗ ∈ Rn of the relaxed problem, and take β ≥ −mini y∗i . Then, we have
y∗ + βe ∈ Rn+ and solution of the relaxed problem according to Lemma 2. Consequently, y∗ + βe is
a solution of Problem 4.
By definition, the tropical hypersurface associated to a tropical polynomial function is the non-
differentiability locus of this function. Since the monomial Pk is homogeneous, its associated tropical
hypersurface is invariant by the translation by a constant vector. Therefore, it can be represented
as a subset of the tropical projective space TPn−1. The latter is defined as the quotient of Rn by
the equivalence relation which identifies two vectors which differ by a constant vector, and it can
be identified to Rn−1 by the map
TPn−1 → Rn−1, y 7→ (yi − yn)i∈[n−1].
Example 1 Consider a simple example with T = 3 time steps (for instance morning, afternoon and
evening), L = 1 (that is n = 3), K = 5 and Jk = ∅ for each k. The parameters of the customers are
ρ1 = [0, 0, 0] , R1 = 1, ρ2 = [0,−1, 0] , R2 = 2 ,
ρ3 = [−1, 1, 0] , R3 = 1 ρ4 = [1/2, 1/2, 0] , R4 = 2,
ρ5 = [1/2, 2, 0] , R5 = 1 .
The tropical polynomial of the first customer is P1(y) = max (y1, y2, y3), meaning that this
customer has no preference and consumes when the incentive is the best. Its associated tropical
hypersurface is a tropical line (since P1 has degree 1), so it splits TP2 in three different regions
corresponding to a choice of the vector u1 among (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0) and (0, 0, 1), see Figure 2. E.g.,
the cell labeled by (1, 0, 0) represents a consumption concentrated the morning, induced by a price
y1 > y2 and y1 > y3.
To study jointly the responses of the five customers, we represent the arrangement of the tropical
hypersurfaces associated to the Pk, k ∈ [5] (see Figure 3), with
P2(y) = max (y1 + y2 − 1, y1 + y3, y2 + y3 − 1) ,
P3(y) = max (y1 − 1, y2 + 1, y3) ,
P4(y) = max (y1 + y2 + 1, y1 + y3 + 1/2, y2 + y3 + 1/2) ,
P5(y) = max (y1 + 1/2, y2 + 2, y3) .
Lemma 3 (Corollary of [30, §4, Lemma 3.1]) Each cell of the arrangement of tropical hy-
persurfaces corresponds to a collection of customers responses (u1, ..., uK) and to a unique traffic
vector N , defined by N =
∑
k uk.
10 Marianne Akian et al.
(0, 0, 1)
(0, 1, 0)
(1, 0, 0)
y1 − y3
y2 − y3
Fig. 2 A customer response: a tropical line splits the projective space into three cells. Each cell corresponds to a
possible customer response
3.2 Decomposition theorem
We next show that the present bilevel problem can be solved by decomposition. We note that the
function to optimize for the higher level problem, i.e. the optimization problem of the provider,
depends only on N . The variables yi allow one to generate the different possible vectors N .
Definition 1 A vector N ∈ Zn is said to be feasible if there exists K vectors u∗1, . . . , u∗K such that
N =
∑K
k=1 u
∗
k and there exists y ∈ Rn such that for each k ∈ [K], u∗k ∈ argmaxuk∈Fk〈ρk + y, uk〉.
So, we will characterize the feasible vectors N in order to optimize directly the satisfaction
function on the set of feasible N . We define the relaxation of Problem 4 to the case y ∈ Rn.
Problem 5 (Bilevel problem with real discounts)
max
y∈Rn
n∑
i=1
fi(Ni) s.t. ∀i,Ni ≤ NCi ,
with N =
∑K
k=1 u
∗
k and for all k ∈ [K], u∗k solution of:
max
uk∈Fk
〈ρk + y, uk〉.
According to Lemma 1, Problem 4 has the same value than the relaxation problem 5. Moreover,
according to Lemma 2, if (y∗, N∗) is an optimal solution of Problem 5, then (y∗ + βe,N∗) is also
an optimal solution of Problem 5 for every β ∈ R. We recall that e ∈ Rn is a vector defined by
eT = (1, . . . , 1). Then, if we find an optimal solution (y∗, N∗) of Problem 5, then (y∗+βe,N∗) with
β = −mini∈[n] y∗i is a solution of Problem 5 such that y∗ + βe ∈ Rn+. Consequently, (y∗ + βe,N∗)
is a solution of Problem 4. Hence, a solution of Problem 5 (with real discounts) provides a solution
of Problem 4 (with nonnegative discounts). In the sequel, we will study the bilevel problem 5.
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(a)
y1 − y3
y2 − y3
Fig. 3 Arrangement of tropical hypersurfaces: each tropical hypersurface corresponds to a customer response. For
example, the cell (a) corresponds to discounts y with responses (1,0,0) for customer 1, (1,0,1) for customer 2, (0,1,0)
for customer 3, (1,1,0) for customer 4 and (0,1,0) for customer 5 . Hence, the total number of customers in the
network with these discounts is (3,3,1).
Most of the following results are applications of classical notions of convex analysis which can be
found in [25]. It is convenient to introduce the convex characteristic function χA of a set A ⊂ Rn,
defined by χA(x) = 0 if x ∈ A, and χA(x) = +∞ otherwise. If A is a convex set, then χA is a
convex function. We define also for every k the polytope ∆k as the convex hull of Fk, together with
the convex function ϕk defined by ϕk(u) = −〈ρk, u〉+ χ∆k(u).
Lemma 4 ∆k = {u ∈ [0, 1]n |
∑n
i=1 u(i) = Rk and ∀i ∈ Jk, u(i) = 0} and Fk is exactly the set of
vertices of ∆k.
Proof. Let us define the polytope ∆′k = {u ∈ [0, 1]n |
∑n
i=1 u(i) = Rk and ∀(t, l) ∈ Jk, u(i) = 0}.
Clearly, Fk ⊂ ∆′k. Then, ∆k ⊂ ∆′k.
Consider a point u of ∆′k which is not in Fk. There exists an index i such that 0 < u(i) < 1.
In particular u(i) /∈ N. However, ∑i u(i) = Rk ∈ N. So, there exists another index j such that
0 < u(j) < 1. Hence, there exists ε > 0 such that the points u− ans u+ defined by:
 u
−(i) = u(i)− ε and u+(i) = u(i) + ε
u−(j) = u(j) + ε and u+(j) = u(j)− ε
u−(k) = u+(k) = u(k) otherwise
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are in ∆′k. Because x =
x−+x+
2 with x 6= x− and x 6= x+, x is not a vertex of ∆′k. Consequently,
the set of vertices of ∆′k is included in Fk. Because ∆
′
k is the convex hull of its vertices, we have
∆′k ⊂ ∆k.
The polytope ∆k is such that ∆k = {u ∈ Rn | 0 ≤ u ≤ a and eTu = Rk}, with a(i) = 0 if i ∈ Jk
and a(i) = 1 otherwise, and eT = (1, . . . , 1) ∈ M1,n(R). Then, because eT is a totally unimodular
matrix, the vertices of ∆k are exactly its integer points, that is Fk.
Corollary 2 The value of each low level problem 3 is the value of the Legendre-Fenchel transform
of ϕk at point y, i.e. ϕ∗k(y) = supuk∈∆k [〈y, uk〉 − ϕk(uk)].
Proof. The vertices of ∆k are Fk. Hence:
max
uk∈Fk
〈ρk + y, uk〉 = sup
uk∈∆k
〈ρk + y, uk〉 = sup
uk∈∆k
〈y, uk〉 − ϕk(uk)
We want to characterize the feasible vectors. We have first the following result.
Lemma 5 Let N be a real vector. Then, there exists y ∈ Rn and u∗1, . . . , u∗K such that N =∑
k∈[K] u
∗
k and for every k ∈ [K], u∗k ∈ argmaxuk∈∆k〈ρk + y, uk〉 if and only if N ∈
∑
k∈[K]∆k.
Proof. Such vectors u∗k belong to ∆k, so N ∈
∑
k∈[K]∆k.
Let k ∈ [K] and y ∈ Rn. A vector u∗k ∈ ∆k is such that u∗k ∈ argmaxuk∈∆k〈ρk + y, uk〉 if and
only if u∗k ∈ ∂ϕ∗k(y), where ∂ϕ∗k denotes the subdifferential of the convex function ϕ∗k. Then, a vector
N =
∑
k u
∗
k if and only if N ∈
∑
k ∂ϕ
∗
k(y). By [25, Th. 23.8],
∑
k ∂ϕ
∗
k(y) = ∂ (
∑
k ϕ
∗
k) (y) = ∂ψ
∗(y),
where ψ = 
k
ϕk is the inf-convolution of the functions ϕk.
Let N be a real vector. Then, there exists y ∈ Rn and u∗1, . . . , u∗K such that N =
∑
k∈[K] u
∗
k
and for every k ∈ [K], u∗k ∈ argmaxuk∈∆k〈ρk + y, uk〉 if and only if N ∈ ∂ψ∗(y), or equivalenty
y ∈ ∂ψ(N) (because ψ is convex), that is if and only if ∂ψ(N) 6= ∅. The function ψ is polyhedral
(as the inf-convolution of polyhedral convex functions) and it is finite at every point in
∑
k∆k.
So, ∀N ′ ∈∑k∆k, ∂ψ(N ′) is a non-empty polyhedral convex set [25, Th. 23.10]. The result comes
straightforwardly.
It is now possible to characterize the feasible vectors.
Lemma 6 A vector N ∈ Zn is feasible if and only if N ∈∑k Fk.
Proof. According to Definition 1, a vector N ∈ Zn is feasible if and only if there exists y ∈ Rn and
K vectors (u∗k)k∈[K] such that N =
∑
k u
∗
k and u
∗
k ∈ argmaxuk∈Fk〈ρk + y, uk〉. As a consequence of
Lemma 4, argmaxuk∈Fk〈ρk+y, uk〉 = argmaxuk∈∆k〈ρk+y, uk〉. Then, by Lemma 5, a vectorN ∈ Zn
is feasible if and only ifN ∈ (∑k∈[K]∆k)∩Zn. We have now to prove∑k∈[K] Fk = (∑k∈[K]∆k)∩Zn.
Because Fk = ∆k∩Zn, the inclusion
∑
k∈[K] Fk ⊂ (
∑
k∈[K]∆k)∩Zn is obvious. Conversely, consider
N ∈ (∑k∈[K]∆k) ∩ Zn. Then, the set ∆N = {(u1, . . . , uK) ∈ ∆1 × · · · ×∆K |∑Kk=1 uk = N} is a
non-empty polytope. A vector u = (u1, . . . , uK) belongs to∆N if it satisfies the following constraints:∀k, i, 0 ≤ uk(i) ≤ 1i∈Jk ,∀k, ∑i uk(i) = Rk ,∀i, ∑k uk(i) = Ni .
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, that is ∆N = {u ∈ RKn | 0 ≤ u ≤ a,Au = b}, with a ∈ RKn such that ak(i) = 1i∈Jk for every
i ∈ [n] , k ∈ [K], and A ∈MK+n,Kn(Z) and b ∈ ZK+n defined by:
A =

1 1 ... 1 0 0 ... 0 ... 0 0 ... 0
0 0 ... 0 1 1 ... 1 ... 0 0 ... 0
...
0 0 ... 0 0 0 ... 0 ... 1 1 ... 1
−1 0 ... 0 −1 0 ... 0 ... −1 0 ... 0
0 −1 ... 0 0 −1 ... 0 ... 0 −1 ... 0
...
0 0 ... −1 0 0 ... −1 ... 0 0 ... −1

and b =

R1
R2
...
RK
−N1
−N2
...
−Nn

By Poincaré’s lemma, A is totally unimodular. In particular, the extreme points of ∆N are integer.
Then, there exists (u∗1, . . . , u∗K) with for every k ∈ [K], u∗k ∈ ∆k∩Zn = Fk such thatN =
∑
k u
∗
k.
Each vector N ∈ ∑k Fk can be written as sum of vectors u∗k ∈ Fk for k ∈ [K] such that there
exists y ∈ Rn with u∗k ∈ argmaxuk∈Fk〈ρk + y, uk〉. In order to determine such vectors u∗k, we have
the following lemma:
Lemma 7 Let N =
∑
k u
∗
k with u
∗
k ∈ ∆k ∀k. The following assertions are equivalent:
1. There exists y ∈ Rn such that for each k ∈ [K], u∗k ∈ argmaxuk∈∆k〈ρk + y, uk〉.
2. The vectors u∗1, . . . , u∗K realize the minimum in the inf-convolution ψ, i.e.
ψ(N) = −
∑
k
〈ρk, u∗k〉
.
Proof. (1) ⇒ (2) : We have for every k:
〈ρk + y, u∗k〉 = sup
uk∈∆k
[〈ρk + y, uk〉]
By summing those equalities, we have:
〈y,N〉+
∑
k
〈ρk, u∗k〉 =
∑
k
sup
uk∈∆k
[〈ρk + y, uk〉]
= sup
u1∈∆1,...,uK∈∆K
∑
k
[〈ρk + y, uk〉]
By considering only the vectors u1 ∈ ∆1, . . . , uK ∈ ∆K such that
∑
k uk = N , we can write∑
k〈ρk, u∗k〉 = sup
u1∈∆1,...,uK∈∆K∑
k uk=N
∑
k〈ρk, uk〉 which is exactly the second assertion.
(2) ⇒ (1): The set ∂ψ(N) is non-empty. Consider y ∈ ∂ψ(N), that is N ∈ ∂ψ∗(y). We can
write:
∀N ′ ∈
∑
k
∆k, 〈y,N〉 − ψ(N) ≥ 〈y,N ′〉 − ψ(N ′)
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So: ∑
k
〈ρk + y, u∗k〉 = 〈y,N〉+
∑
k
〈ρk, u∗k〉 = 〈y,N〉 − ψ(N)
= sup
N ′∈∑k∆k [〈y,N
′〉 − ψ(N ′)]
= sup
N ′∈∑k∆k
〈y,N ′〉+ sup
u1∈∆1,...,uK∈∆K∑
k uk=N
′
∑
k
〈ρk, uk〉

= sup
u1∈∆1,...,uK∈∆K
∑
k
〈ρk + y, uk〉
=
∑
k
sup
uk∈∆k
〈ρk + y, uk〉
Consequently, if one u∗k is not an optimal solution of the low-level problem, the previous equality
cannot be true.
The high-level problem of Problem 5 consists in maximizing a function depending only on a
vector N which has to be a feasible vector. It is now possible to write the main theorem of this
section, which establishes a decomposition method for solving Problem 5.
Theorem 1 (Decomposition) The bilevel problem 5 can be solved as follows:
1. Find an optimal solution N∗ to the high level problem with unknown N :
max
N∈∑k Fk
n∑
i=1
fi(Ni) s.t. ∀i, Ni ≤ NCi . (6)
2. Find vectors (u∗1, . . . , u∗K) solutions of the following problem:
max
u1∈F1,...,uK∈FK∑
k uk=N
∗
∑
k
〈ρk, uk〉 .
3. Find a vector y∗ such that ∀k, u∗k is a solution of the low level problem.
Proof. The bilevel programming problem 5 can be rewritten maxN feasible
∑
i fi(Ni) subject to
∀i ∈ [n] , Ni ≤ NCi . According to Lemma 6, N is feasible if and only if N ∈
∑
k Fk. So, a necessary
condition for a vector y∗ to be an optimal solution of the bilevel problem is that for every k, there
exists u∗k ∈ ∂ϕ∗k(y∗) such that N∗ =
∑
k u
∗
k is an optimal solution of the problem:
max
N∈∑k Fk
∑
i
fi(Ni)
s.t. ∀i, Ni ≤ NCi
After finding N∗, it is possible to find u∗k ∈ ∂ϕ∗k(y∗) by solving the inf-convolution problem as
a consequence of Lemma 7. Because u∗k ∈ ∂ϕ∗k(y∗) is equivalent to y∗ ∈ ∂ϕk(u∗k), each point of⋂
k ∂ϕk(u
∗
k) is an optimal solution of the bilevel problem.
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The second step of this theorem consists in solving a linear program. We next show that the
third step reduces to a linear feasibility problem.
Lemma 8 Let N ∈ Zn be a feasible vector and u∗k ∈ Fk (k ∈ [K]) be vectors such that N =∑
k u
∗
k and ψ(N) = −
∑
k〈ρk, u∗k〉. Then, the set of vectors y∗ ∈ Rn such that ∀k ∈ [K], u∗k ∈
argmaxuk∈Fk〈ρk + y∗, uk〉 is non-empty and is the polytope defined by the following inequalities:
∀k ∈ [K] , ∀i, j /∈ Jk, such that u∗k(i) = 1, u∗k(j) = 0, ρk(i) + y∗i ≥ ρk(j) + y∗j
Proof. According to Lemma 7, there exists y∗ ∈ ⋂k ∂ϕk(u∗k). Hence, we have ∀uk ∈ Fk, 〈ρk +
y∗, u∗k〉 ≥ 〈ρk + y∗, uk〉.
Consider indices i, j /∈ Jk with u∗k(i) = 1, u∗k(j) = 0, and the vector uk defined by uk(i) = 0,
uk(j) = 1 and ∀l 6= i, j, uk(l) = u∗k(l). We verify easily uk ∈ Fk, so that the condition 〈ρk+y∗, u∗k〉 ≥
〈ρk + y∗, uk〉, which can be rewritten ρk(i) + y∗i ≥ ρk(j) + y∗j , is satisfied.
Moreover, this condition is sufficient. Consider y∗ such that ∀i, j /∈ Jk with u∗k(i) = 1, u∗k(j) = 0,
we have ρk(i)+y∗(i) ≥ ρk(j)+y∗(j). Consider uk ∈ Fk. By definition of Fk, the quantity 〈ρk+y∗, uk〉
corresponds to the sum of Rk coordinates of ρk + y∗ for which the index is not in Jk. Hence,
〈ρk + y∗, uk〉 =
∑
i,uk(i)=1,u∗k(i)=1
(ρk(i) + y
∗
i ) +
∑
j,uk(j)=1,u∗k(j)=0
(
ρk(j) + y
∗
j
)
≤
∑
i,uk(i)=1,u∗k(i)=1
(ρk(i) + y
∗
i ) +
∑
j,uk(j)=0,u∗k(j)=1
(
ρk(j) + y
∗
j
)
= 〈ρk + y∗, uk〉
because of the lemma hypothesis and because #{j|uk(j) = 1, u∗k(j) = 0} = #{j|uk(j) = 0, u∗k(j) =
1}
For every k, the latter inequalities define a polytope, and we have to find y∗ in the intersection
of all these polytopes.
4 A first algorithm
In this section, we explain how the decomposition method provided by Theorem 1 leads to a
polynomial time algorithm for solving Problem 5. We will use some elements of discrete convexity
developed by Danilov, Koshevoy [9] and Murota [22], that we recall first. We next explain how to
solve Problem 5.
An integer set B ⊂ Zn is M -convex [22, Ch. 4, p.101] if ∀x, y ∈ B, ∀i ∈ [n] such that xi >
yi,∃j ∈ [n] such that xj < yj , x− ei+ ej ∈ B and y+ ei− ej ∈ B, where ei is the i-th vector of the
canonical basis in Rn.
Lemma 9 The feasible domain of the high-level program
B = {N ∈
∑
k
Fk|∀i Ni ≤ NCi }
is a M -convex set of Zn.
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Proof. We can check easily that ∀k, the set Fk is M -convex. Taking two different vectors uk and
vk in Fk, there exist i, j such that uk(i) = 1, vk(i) = 0 and uk(j) = 0, vk(j) = 1. These indices i, j
do not belong to Jk. The vectors uk − ei + ej and vk + ei − ej have coordinates in {0, 1} with a
sum equal to Rk and all coordinates in Jk equal to 0.
It is known that a Minkowski sum of M -convex sets is M -convex [22, Th. 4.23, p.115], and so
the set
∑
k Fk is M -convex.
Finally, consider two vectors N and N ′ of B. They belong to
∑
k Fk, so for each i with Ni > N
′
i ,
we can find j with Nj < N ′j such that N−ei+ej and N ′+ei−ej are in
∑
k Fk. The i-th coordinate
of N − ei + ej is Ni − 1 < Ni ≤ NCl and the j-th coordinate of N − ei + ej is Nj + 1 ≤ N ′j ≤ NCj .
So N − ei + ej ∈ B and similarly N ′ + ei − ej ∈ B, which proves the M -convexity of B.
A function g : Zn 7→ R is M -convex [22, ch. 6.1, p.133] if ∀x, y ∈ Zn such that g(x) and g(y) are
finite real values, ∀i ∈ [n] such that xi > yi, ∃j ∈ [n] such that xj < yj and the following condition
holds true:
g(x) + g(y) ≥ g(x− ei + ej) + g(y + ei − ej)
A function g isM -concave if −g isM -convex. It follows from this definition that if B is aM -convex
set, then χB is a M -convex function (we recall that χB : Zn 7→ R is defined by χB(x) = 0 if x ∈ B
and χB(x) = +∞ otherwise). An important property ofM -convex functions is that local optimality
guarantees global optimality [22, Th. 6.26, p.148] in the following sense. Let g be a M -convex
function and x ∈ Zn. Then g(x) = miny∈Zn g(y) if and only if ∀i, j ∈ [n] , g(x) ≤ g(x− ei + ej).
According to Theorem 1, we have to solvemaxN∈Zn f(N)−χB(N), where f : N 7→
∑
i fi(Ni) is a
separable concave function, and B is theM -convex set introduced in Lemma 9. The function f−χB
is M -concave [22, Th. 6.13.(4), p.143]. Then, we have the following result as a direct consequence
of [22, Th. 6.26, p.148] :
Theorem 2 Let N∗ ∈ B. Then, N∗ is a maximum point of f over B if and only if ∀i, j ∈ [n] such
that N∗ − ei + ej ∈ B, f(N∗ − ei + ej) ≤ f(N∗).
Moreover, Murota ([22], ch.10, p.281) gives an algorithm which runs in pseudo-polynomial time
to minimize M -convex functions (see Algorithm 1).
Algorithm 1 Murota’s greedy algorithm to minimize a M -convex function g.
1. Find x ∈ Zn such that g(x) < +∞;
2. Find i, j ∈ argmink,l∈[n] g(x− ek + el);
3. If g(x− ei + ej) ≥ g(x) then stop (x is a global minimizer of g);
4. Else x := x− ei + ej and go back to Step 2;
By adding a priority rule in Step 2 of Algorithm 1 in the case where arg mink,l∈[n] f(x− ek+ el)
is not reduced to a single point, a global minimizer of f is obtained by Algorithm 1in pseudo-
polynomial time.
Proposition 1 ([22], Prop.10.2) Assume that dom f is bounded. Let F be the number of arith-
metic operations needed to evaluate f and K1 = max(||x− y||1 | x, y ∈ dom f). Then, if a vector in
dom f is given, Algorithm 1 finds a global minimizer of f in O(Fn2K1) time.
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However, the minimization of a M -convex function can be achieved in polynomial time.
Proposition 2 ([22], Prop.10.4) Assume that dom f is bounded. Let F be the number of arith-
metic operations needed to evaluate f and K∞ = max(||x− y||∞ | x, y ∈ dom f). Then, if a vector
in dom f is given, a global minimizer of f can be found in O(Fn3 log2(K∞/n)) time.
The different algorithms developed by Murota [22, Section 10.1] provide a minimizer of a M -
convex function in polynomial time, if an initial point is given and if the domain of the function is
bounded. Whereas it is trivial to find a vector of Zn such that ∀i, Ni ≤ NCi or a vector N belonging
to
∑
k Fk, it is not obvious to find one satisfying both conditions. In fact, such a point can be
obtained by solving the minimization problem:
min
N∈∑k Fk
∑
i
max(Ni −NCi , 0)
The condition N ∈ B is equivalent to N ∈ arg minN∈∑k Fk∑imax(Ni − NCi , 0) if B is non-
empty. The function N 7→ ∑imax(Ni − NCi , 0) is separable convex. Then, the function N 7→∑
imax(Ni −NCi , 0) + χ∑k Fk is M -convex according to [22, Th. 6.13.(4), p.148]. Because ∑k Fk
is bounded and a point in
∑
k Fk can be obtained in O(Kn) operations by summing vectors taken
in each set Fk, it is possible to find a point N0 ∈ arg minN∈∑k Fk∑imax(Ni − NCi , 0) = B in
polynomial time, by Proposition 2.
We can finally write the following result about the complexity of the decomposition method
given by Theorem 1.
Theorem 3 Let R =
∑
k Rk, for every k ∈ [K], nk = n − #Jk and R =
∑
k Rk(nk − Rk). An
optimal solution of Problem 5 can be obtained in O((Kn)3.5Ln3 log2(K/n)+(n+R)3.5L) arithmetic
operations, where L is the input size of the bilevel problem.
Proof. The first step of Theorem 1 is a maximization of a M -concave function over a bounded
domain B. Finding a point in B can be done by solving the M -convex minimization problem:
min
N∈∑k Fk
∑
i
max(Ni −NCi , 0)
The domain of the function N 7→∑imax(Ni −NCi , 0) + χ∑k Fk is ∑k Fk. We define K1∞ by:
K1∞ = max{||N −N ′||∞ | N,N ′ ∈
∑
k
Fk}
For every N ∈ ∑kNk, the entries of N are sum of K binary values. Then, K1∞ ≤ K. We have
to estimate the number of operations F 1 needed to evaluate the function N 7→ ∑imax(Ni −
NCi , 0) + χ
∑
k Fk
. The function N 7→ ∑imax(Ni − NCi , 0) can be evaluated in O(n) operations.
As a consequence of Lemma 6 and Lemma 7,
∑
k Fk = (
∑
k∆k) ∩ Zn. Hence, for any vector N ,
the conditions N ∈ ∑k Fk is equivalent to N ∈ (∑k∆k) ∩ Zn. A vector N belongs to ∑k∆k if
there exists for every k ∈ [K] a vector uk ∈ ∆k such that
∑
k uk = N . Hence, to know whether
N belongs to
∑
k∆k or not is a linear feasibility problem in dimension Kn, It can be solved in
O((Kn)3.5L) arithmetic operations by an interior point method ([24]). Here L is the input size
of the linear program. Consequently, F 1 = O((Kn)3.5L), and a point in B can be obtained in
O((Kn)3.5Ln3 log2(K/n)) by Theorem 2.
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After obtaining a point in B, the first step of Theorem 1 consists in solving the M -concave
maximization problem:
max
N∈B
∑
i
fi(Ni).
The domain of the function N 7→ ∑i fi(Ni) − χB(N) is bounded and equal to B. We define K2∞
by:
K2∞ = max{||N −N ′||∞ | N,N ′ ∈ B}
For every N ∈ ∑kNk, the entries of N are sum of K binary values. Then, for every i ∈ [n],
we have Ni ≤ min(K,NCi ) Then, K2∞ ≤ min(K,N
C
), with N
C
= maxi∈[n]NCi . The num-
ber of operations F 2 needed to evaluate the function N 7→ ∑imax(Ni − NCi , 0) − χB(N) is
O((Kn)3.5L) like previously. Hence, a point N∗ ∈ arg maxN∈B
∑
i fi(Ni) can be obtained in
O((Kn)3.5Ln3 log2(min(K,N
C
)/n)) by Theorem 2.
According to the proof of Lemma 6, the second step of Theorem 1 is a linear program in
dimension Kn. In fact, we have:
max
u1∈F1,...,uK∈FK∑
k uk=N
∗
∑
k
〈ρk, uk〉 = max
u1∈∆1,...,uK∈∆K∑
k uk=N
∗
∑
k
〈ρk, uk〉 ,
and the extreme points of the polyhedron ∆N defined by:
∆N = {(u1, . . . , uK) ∈ ∆1 ×∆K |
∑
k
uk = N}
are integer. Hence, the second step of Theorem 1 can be solved in O((Kn)3.5L) arithmetic opera-
tions.
The third step of Theorem 1 is a linear program in n variables. For some u∗k ∈ Fk, the constraints
of this program are:
∀k ∈ [K] , ∀i, j /∈ Jk, such that u∗k(i) = 1, u∗k(j) = 0, ρk(i) + y∗i ≥ ρk(j) + y∗j .
For every k ∈ [K], the number of entries of u∗k equal to 1 is Rk, and the number of entries of u∗k
equal to 0 and which do not belong to Jk is nk. Hence, the number of inequality constraints of this
linear program is
∑
k Rk(nk − Rk) = R. Hence, a solution of this linear program can be found in
O((n+R)3.5L) by interior-point methods.
5 A faster algorithm for solving the bilevel problem
5.1 A polynomial time algorithm for the bilevel problem
Algorithm 1 can be applied to solve problem (6) of Theorem 1, that is maximizing the M -concave
function f − χB , or equivalently minimizing the M -convex function −f + χB .
Step 1 consists in finding an initial vector N ∈ B. As explained in Section 4, this can be done
by solving a M -convex minimization problem. Another approach consists in replacing the function
f − χB by g : N 7→ f(N) − χ∑
k Fk
(N) −M∑imax(Ni − NCi , 0), where M > 0 is an integer.
If N ∈ B, then g(N) = f(N). If M is sufficiently large, then M∑imax(Ni − NCi , 0) ≥ M if
N /∈ B, and the maximum of the function g is attained for N ∈ B. Moreover N 7→M∑imax(Ni−
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NCi , 0) is separable convex, then g is M -concave according to [22, Th. 6.13.(4), p.148]. Then, both
problems maxN∈B f(N) and maxN∈Zn g(N) are equivalent, and we can apply Algorithm 1 to solve
the problem maxN∈Zn g(N). An initial point is obtained by taking any point in
∑
k Fk.
We need first part is to determine the number F of operations to evaluate g. Because the different
functions fi are known, we have to determine the number of operations to decide whether a vector
N belongs to
∑
k Fk or not. More precisely, the different evaluations of f − χB are done in Step 2.
Hence, the question is the following: given a vector N ∈ ∑k Fk, how many operations are needed
to check whether N − ei+ ej (for i, j ∈ [n]) belongs to
∑
k Fk. We next show that this problem can
be studied as a shortest path problem in a graph. Consider N ∈∑k Fk and let us define u∗k ∈ Fk
for k ∈ [K] such that ψ(N) = ∑k〈ρk, u∗k〉, that is an optimal decomposition of N in Theorem 1.
For each k ∈ [K] and α, β ∈ [n], we define by wkαβ the following quantity: wkαβ = ρk(α) − ρk(β)
if u∗k(α) = 1 and u
∗
k(β) = 0, and w
k
αβ = +∞ otherwise. Then, we define for each α, β ∈ [n],
wαβ = mink∈[K] wkαβ . We consider the oriented valuated graph G = (V,E) where the set of vertices
V = [n] and there is an oriented edge between each vertices α, β ∈ V of value wαβ .
Theorem 4 Let i, j ∈ [n]. Suppose that there exists a path in G with finite valuation between the
vertices i, j ∈ V . Then N − ei + ej ∈
∑
k Fk. Moreover, there are no negative cycles and there is
a shortest path between i and j. Let (αu)0≤u≤p be any sequence such that α0 = i, αp = j and let
α0 → α1 . . . αp−1 → αp be a shortest path between i and j. Let also (ku)0≤u≤p−1 be any sequence
such that wkuαuαu+1 = wαuαu+1 for all 0 ≤ u ≤ p − 1. Let us finally define the vectors v∗k, k ∈ [K]
such that v∗ku = u
∗
ku
− eαu + eαu+1 for each 0 ≤ u ≤ p− 1 and v∗k = u∗k for each k /∈ {k0, . . . , kp−1}.
Then, ψ(N − ei + ej) =
∑
k〈ρk, v∗k〉.
Proof. By Lemma 6 and 7, we know that N − ei + ej ∈
∑
k Fk if and only if there exists K vectors
v∗k such that N − ei + ej =
∑
k v
∗
k with each v
∗
k ∈ Fk and ψ(N − ei + ej) = −
∑
k 〈ρk, v∗k〉. We
consider ψ(N) = −∑k 〈ρk, u∗k〉 with each u∗k ∈ Fk. Hence, ψ(N − ei + ej)− ψ(N) is equal to:
min
vk∈Fk and
∑
k vk=N−ei+ej
∑
k
〈ρk, u∗k − vk〉.
We have
∑
k(u
∗
k − vk) = ei − ej . When vk describes Fk, the possible u∗k − vk are the vectors xk
with the following properties:
n∑
α=1
xk(α) = 0, ∀α s.t. u∗k(α) = 1, xk(α) ∈ {0; 1},
∀α ∈ Jk, xk(α) = 0, ∀α s.t. u∗k(α) = 0, xk(α) ∈ {−1; 0}
Hence, ψ(N − ei + ej) − ψ(N) =
∑
k〈ρk, x∗k〉, where x∗k is such that #{α | x∗k(α) = 1} = #{α |
x∗k(α) = −1}. Consequently, ψ(N − ei+ ej)−ψ(N) can be written as a sum of wkαβ for certain α, β.
Because of the condition
∑
k u
∗
k − vk = ei − ej , we have ψ(N − ei + ej)−ψ(N) = wk0α0α1 +wk1α1α2 +
· · ·+ wkp−1αp−1αp , with the notations introduced in Theorem 4.
Consider now the graph defined in Theorem 4. If there exists a path between i and j, then its
value can be written wl0β0β1 + w
l1
β1β2
+ · · · + wlq−1βq−1βq (with the convention β0 = i and βq = j). By
defining vk = u∗k if k /∈ {l0, . . . , lq−1} and vlu = u∗lu − eβu + eβu+1 for 0 ≤ u ≤ q−1 , the value of the
path is equal to
∑
k〈ρk, u∗k − vk〉. Because wluβuβu+1 < +∞, we have u∗lu(βu) = 1 and u∗lu(βu+1) = 0.
Then, each vk ∈ Fk. Consequently, the value minvk∈Fk and ∑k vk=N−ei+ej∑k 〈ρk, u∗k − vk〉 is finite
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and N − ei + ej ∈
∑
k Fk. Moreover, the value ψ(N − ei + ej)− ψ(N) corresponds to the minimal
values of the path between i and j in G, that is the shortest path. Hence, if the value of the shortest
path is
∑p−1
u=0 w
lu
αuαu+1 , we have ψ(N − ei+ ej)−ψ(N) =
∑
k〈ρk, u∗k− v∗k〉, with v∗k defined as in the
statement of Theorem 4. Moreover, we can prove that there exists no cycle with negative weight
in this graph. Suppose that such a cycle exists. It can be written wl0γ0γ1 + w
l1
γ1γ2 + · · ·+ wlrγrγ0 < 0.
For all i ∈ {0 . . . r}, we have uli(γi) = 1 and uli(γi+1) = 0. We consider for k ∈ [K] the vectors vk
defined by vli = u∗li − eγi + eγi+1 , and vk = u∗k for k /∈ {l0, . . . , lr}. We have
∑
k u
∗
k − vk = 0 and so∑
k 〈ρk, uk〉 =
∑
k 〈ρk, vk〉+wk1α1α2+wk2α2α3+ · · ·+w
kp
αpα1 <
∑
k 〈ρk, vk〉 which refutes the optimality
of the vectors u∗k in the definition of ψ(N).
Example 2 We consider the cell (a) of Figure 3. We build the graph associated to N = (3, 3, 1) (see
Figure 4).
1
2
3
0
1.5
0.51
0
Fig. 4 Graph G associated to the vector N = (3, 3, 1)
Consider N ′ = N − e1 + e2 = (2, 4, 1). The shortest path in G is 1 → 2 with w12 = 0 = w112.
Then, according to Theorem 4, the optimal decomposition of (2, 4, 1) is v∗1 = (0, 1, 0), v∗2 = (1, 0, 1),
v∗3 = (0, 1, 0), v∗4 = (1, 1, 0) and v∗5 = (0, 1, 0).
Thanks to Theorem 4, if we know that a vector N belongs to
∑
k Fk, it is possible to check
whether a vector N − ei+ ej belongs to Fk by checking if there exists a path between i and j in the
graph G = (V,E). Generally, G has n vertices and n2 edges. From each vertex i ∈ V , it is possible
to find if there exists a path between i and j by using a depth-first or breadth first search algorithm
in O(n2) operations. Consequently, the number of operations needed to evaluate g is O(n3).
According to Theorem 4, by checking if N − ei + ej ∈ B, we obtain the optimal decomposition
of N −ei+ej =
∑
k v
∗
k such that ψ(N −ei+ej) = −
∑
k〈ρk, v∗k〉 by solving a shortest path problem
between two vertices. This can be done in O(n3) operations thanks to Ford-Bellman algorithm ([4],
[12]), because the graph G has n vertices and at most n2 edges. Hence, according to Theorem 1, it
suffices to solve the bilevel problem 5 to solve the linear feasibility problem of Lemma 8. Moreover,
this problem can also be viewed as a shortest path problem in G, according to the following result.
Theorem 5 Consider K vectors u∗k ∈ Fk for each k ∈ [K] such that, if we define N =
∑
k u
∗
k,
we have ψ(N) = −∑k〈ρk, u∗k〉. Consider the graph G associated to N . Consider an index s ∈ [n].
Let M > 0 be any real scalar such that M ≥ nmaxi,j∈[n] wij and let us modify G such that for all
t ∈ [n] with t 6= s and wst = +∞, we have wst =M . Let us define a vector y∗ ∈ Rn by y∗s = 0 and
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for each t ∈ [n] with t 6= s, y∗t is the length of the shortest path between s and t in G. Then, for M
sufficiently large and for each k ∈ [K], u∗k ∈ argmaxuk∈Fk〈ρk + y∗, uk〉.
Proof. According to Lemma 8, a vector y ∈ Rn is such that for every k ∈ [K],
u∗k ∈ arg max
uk∈Fk
〈ρk + y, uk〉
if and only if the following inequalities are satisfied:
∀k ∈ [K] , ∀i, j /∈ Jk, such that u∗k(i) = 1, u∗k(j) = 0, ρk(i) + yi ≥ ρk(j) + yj .
Consider such a vector y. Consider also the graph G associated to N The previous inequalities can
be rewritten ∀k ∈ [K] ,∀i, j ∈ [n] , yj − yi ≤ wkij , or equivalently : ∀i, j ∈ [n] , yj − yi ≤ wij . For
each δ ∈ R, y + δe is also a solution. Consequently, it is possible to fix a coordinate to 0. Take a
coordinate s such that ys = 0. Consider M > 0 such that M ≥ nmaxi,j wij and modify the graph
G as in the statement of the theorem. Consider an elementary cycle (that is a cycle containing no
smaller cycle) of the modified graph. The cycle has no more than n− 1 edges. Suppose that exactly
q edges have a modified weight, with 0 ≤ q ≤ n− 1. If q = 0, then no edge has a modified weight,
and this cycle is a cycle of G. So, its weight is nonnegative. If q ≥ 1, then the total weight of the
cycle is bigger than qM + (n− 1− q)mini,j wij ≥ n(maxi,j wij −mini,j wij) ≥ 0. Consequently, the
modified graph has no negative cycles.
For each t ∈ [n], with t 6= s, there exists a path between s and t. Let us define y∗ such that
y∗s = 0 and for each t ∈ [n] with t 6= s, y∗t corresponds to the length of the shortest path between
s and t. Consider i, j ∈ [n]. Then y∗i + wij is the length of a path between s and j defined as the
concatenation of the shortest path between s and i and the edge i → j. So y∗i + wij ≥ y∗j . Hence,
according to Lemma 8, we have for each k ∈ [K], u∗k ∈ argmaxuk∈Fk〈ρk + y∗, u∗k〉.
These different results lead to Algorithm 2 to solve the bilevel problem 5. First, we have to find an
initial point N in
∑
k Fk, with its optimal decomposition
∑
k u
∗
k. We can calculate for each k ∈ [K]
and for each i, j /∈ Jk the value wkij , store them, and then define the graph G associated to N . Hence,
with a graph search algorithm, we know for each i, j ∈ [n] whether N − ei+ ej ∈
∑
k Fk or not, and
can calculate g(N − ek + ek) for each k, l ∈ [n] and find i, j ∈ arg maxk,l g(N − ek + el). By finding
the shortest path between i and j in G, we obtain the optimal decomposition N − ei+ ej =
∑
k v
∗
k.
Like in Algorithm 1, if g(N −ei+ej) ≤ g(N), then N∗ = N is the maximum value of g over
∑
k Fk.
Else, we take N := N−ei+ej . For all the indices k such that u∗k 6= v∗k, we evaluate the new value of
wkij and we define the graph G associated to N − ei+ ej and restart the algorithm. Notice that the
number of indices k such that u∗k 6= v∗k is bounded by the length of the shortest path in G; it means
that this number is less than n. After finding the optimal N∗ and having its optimal decomposition
N∗ =
∑
k u
∗
k, we can redefine the graph associated to N
∗ and return an optimal y∗ defines as in
the statement of Theorem 5.
Algorithm 2 can be written as follows. We take in input a function GraphSearch, which associate
to a graph G (defined by the weight vector w of its edges) a Boolean vector b such that bij = 1
if there is an edge between i and j and 0 otherwise. We also take a function ShortestPath, which
associate to a graph G (also defined by the weight vector w) and two vertices i and j, the value v of
the shortest path and a vector path with the indices of this shortest path. Finally, we consider the
function ShortestPath2, which associate to w and a vertex s a vector corresponding to the values
of the shortest path between s and all other vertices in G. For much ease, we denote by f∗ the
function f∗ : N 7→ f(N) +M∑ni=1max(Ni −NCi , 0).
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Algorithm 2 Solving the bi-level problem, for one application and one type of contract
Require: u∗k ∈ Fk, ∀k ∈ [K],ρk,∀k ∈ [K], f∗, GraphSearch, ShortestPath, ShortestPath2, s ∈ [n]
Ensure: N∗ optimal number of customers, y∗ optimal discount vector
N ←∑Kk=1 u∗k
for all k ∈ [K] do
for all i, j /∈ Jk do
if uk(i) = 1 and uk(j) = 0 then
wkij ← ρk(i)− ρk(j)
end if
end for
end for
for all i, j ∈ [n] do
wij ← mink∈[K] wkij ; kij ∈ argmink∈[K] wkij
end for
stop← 0
while stop = 0 do
b← GraphSearch(w)
gN ← f∗(N); g∗ ← maxu,v∈[n],buv=1 f∗(N − eu + ev); i, j ∈ argmaxu,v∈[n],buv=1 f∗(N − eu + ev)
if g∗ ≤ gN then
stop← 1
else
(v, path)← Shortestpath(w, i, j); N ← N − ei + ej
for q = 1 to Length(path)− 1 do
α← path(q); β ← path(q + 1); k ← kαβ ; u∗k(α) = 0; u∗k(β) = 1
for all γ /∈ Jk do
wkαγ ← +∞; wkγβ ← +∞
if u∗k(γ) = 1 then
wkγα ← ρk(γ)− ρk(α)
else
wkβγ ← ρk(β)− ρk(γ)
end if
end for
end for
for all i, j ∈ [n] do
wij ← mink∈[K] wkij ; kij ∈ argmink∈[K] wkij
end for
end if
end while
M ← 1 + nmaxi,j∈[n] wij
for all t ∈ [n] do
if t 6= s AND wst = +∞ then
wst =M
end if
y∗ ← Shortestpath2(w, s)
y∗s ← 0
end for
Note that the pseudo-polynomial time bound for Murota’s greedy algorithm 1 given by Propo-
sition 1 leads in this special case to a polynomial time bound, as explained in the following result.
Theorem 6 Let us define R =
∑
k Rk, for each k ∈ [K] nk = n − #Jk (that is the number of
possible non-zero entries of the vectors of Fk) and R =
∑
k Rk(nk − Rk). Algorithm 2 returns a
global optimizer with a time complexity of O(R(n3 +R)) and a space complexity of O(R).
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Proof. The vector returned by the algorithm is a global optimizer according to Algorithm 1 and
Theorem 4. The initialization consists in taking vectors in each Fk and in adding them; it can be
done in O(K) operations. Then, to define the graph G, we have to calculate wkij for each i, j /∈ Jk
and each k ∈ [K], and to store the values. Let us define for each k ∈ [K] nk = n − #Jk. For
each k ∈ [K], we have Rk ≤ nk, and there are precisely Rk coordinates of u∗k equal to 1 for each
u∗k ∈ Fk. Then, for each k ∈ [K], there are exactly Rk(nk −Rk) finite values of wkij to store. Then,
by defining R =
∑
k Rk(nk − Rk), we need O(R) operations to define wij and kij . The function
GraphSearch needs O(n3) operations by a depth-first or breadth-first algorithm to know if there
is a path between i and j. The function ShortestPath needs also O(n3) operations to calculate the
shortest path between i and j with Ford-Bellman algorithm. The length of the path is bounded by
n. Consequently, there is less than n vectors u∗k which have to be updated; and then less than 2nnk
values wkαβ to update. R operations are needed to calculate the new values of wij and kij . So, the
number of operations in each step of the "while" loop is O(n3+nR). The number of iterations of the
loop is the same as in Algorithm 1, and is bounded by K1 where K1 = max(||x−y||1, x, y ∈
∑
k Fk).
For each x, y ∈∑k Fk, we have:
||x− y||1 =
n∑
i=1
|xi − yi| ≤
n∑
i=1
(xi + yi) = 2R
by defining R =
∑K
k=1Rk. Finally, to find the optimal y
∗, n2 operations are needed to find M ,
and O(n3) operations are needed to evaluate the function ShortestPath2 by using again the Ford-
Bellman algorithm. Step 7 consists in calculating the shortest path between a vertex s and the
other ones in a graph with n vertices and n2 edges. Then, Step 7 can be obtained in O(n3) thanks
to Ford-Bellman algorithm. Hence, the global time complexity of Algorithm 2 is O(R(n3+R)) and
space complexity is O(R).
Notice that for each k ∈ [K], nk ≤ n and 1 ≤ Rk ≤ nk. Then K ≤ R ≤ nK and 0 ≤ R ≤ Kn2.
Therefore, the time complexity of Algorithm 2 is O(Kn3(K + n)) in the worst case, whereas the
space complexity is O(Kn2).
Example 3 Consider again Example 1 together with the concave function f defined by
f : N 7→ −
∑
t,l
N(t, l)2.
We suppose that ∀k,Jk = ∅. Hence, we can prove that
∑
k Fk = {N ∈ N3|
∑3
i=1Ni = 7 and
max(Ni) ≤ 5}. First, we want to solve maxN∈∑k Fk −(N21 +N22 +N23 ). We start from N (0) =
(5, 2, 0), a feasible point. Following Algorithm 1, we compute N (1) = (4, 2, 1) and N (2) = (3, 2, 2)
which is a minimizer. We takeN∗ = (3, 2, 2). Now, we solvemaxu1∈F1,...,u5∈F5,∑5k=1 uk=N∗∑k 〈ρk, uk〉.
We obtain u∗1 = [1, 0, 0], u∗2 = [1, 0, 1], u∗3 = [0, 1, 0], u∗4 = [1, 0, 1], u∗5 = [0, 1, 0]. Applying Lemma 8,
we obtain the linear inequalities y∗1−y∗2 ≤ 3/2, 0 ≤ y∗1−y∗3 and −1 ≤ y∗2−y∗3 ≤ −1/2. In particular,
y∗ = (3/4, 0, 3/4) is an optimal solution.
5.2 A particular case : theory of majorization
Algorithm 2 can be accelerated in the particular case ∀k ∈ [K] , Jk = ∅, that is Fk = {uk ∈ {0; 1}n|
∑n
i=1 uk(i) = Rk}.
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As previously, an important step of the maximization of the function g consists in being able to
know whether a point belongs to
∑
k Fk or not. In this particular case, we can use the majorization
order [23]. For every x ∈ Rn, denote by x[1] ≥ · · · ≥ x[n] the coordinates of x arranged in nonin-
creasing order. A vector x ∈ Rn is said to be majorized by another vector y ∈ Rn, denoted x ≺ y,
if
∑n
i=1 xi =
∑n
i=1 yi and ∀1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1,
∑k
i=1 x[i] ≤
∑k
i=1 y[i].
We have the following result.
Theorem 7 (Gale-Ryser , see [23, Th. 7.C.1]) Let a ∈ Nk and b ∈ Nn be two integer vectors
with nonnegative values. Let a∗ ∈ Nn defined by a∗i = #j | aj ≥ i. Then, the following assertions
are equivalent:
1. b ≺ a∗
2. There exists a matrix U ∈ ‖, \(Z) such that for each i, j, uij ∈ {0; 1}, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ k,
∑n
j=1 uij = ai
and ∀1 ≤ j ≤ n, ∑ki=1 uij = bj
Corollary 3 Denoting by fr = (1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0) the vector with exactly r 1 and by pr = #{k|Rk =
r}, for 1 ≤ r ≤ n, we have ∑k Fk = {N ∈ Nn|N ≺∑nr=1 prfr}.
Proof. A vector N belongs to
∑
k Fk if and only if for each i ∈ [n], Ni corresponds to the sum of
the coefficients of the i-th column of a matrix of size K×n with coefficients in {0; 1} and such that
the sum of the coefficients of the k-th line is Rk. We conclude by 7.
Example 4 Consider Example 1. We have p1 = 3, p2 = 2 and p3 = 0. So N is feasible iff N verifies
N ≺ (5, 2, 0) .
Like for Algorithm 2, we need to know for a given N ∈∑k Fk whether N − ei+ ej ∈∑k Fk for
each i, j ∈ [n]. It is possible to answer to this question in polynomial time in n by sorting N−ei+ej
for each i, j and by checking the condition N − ei + ej ≺ Nmax. The time complexity of such a
procedure is O(n3 log(n)). However, it can be accelerated thanks to the following result.
Lemma 10 Let N ∈ ∑k Fk, and i, j ∈ [n]. Let S be the function defined on Rn × [n] such that
∀x ∈ Rn,∀k ∈ [n], S(x, k) is the sum of the k largest values of the coordinates of x. Suppose finally
that Nj is the kj-th largest value of the coordinates of N (if kj > 1, then we suppose that the
kj − 1-th largest value of N is strictly bigger than Nj), and that Ni is the ki-th largest value of
the coordinates of N (if ki < n, then we suppose that the ki + 1-th largest value of N is strictly
smaller than Nj). Then N − ei + ej ∈
∑
k Fk if and only if Ni > 0 and, either Ni > Nj or
∀kj ≤ k ≤ ki, S(N, k) < S(Nmax, k).
Proof. Suppose N − ei + ej ∈
∑
k Fk. Then Ni − 1 ≥ 0 and Ni > 0. Moreover, suppose Ni ≤ Nj .
Then, Ni − 1 < Nj + 1 and S(N, k) = S(N, k) + 1. Then, S(N, k) < S(N, k) + 1 = S(Nmax, k).
Conversely, if Ni > 0, then all the coordinates of N−ei+ej are nonnegative integers. If Ni > Nj ,
then we easily see that N − ei+ ej ≺ N . So N − ei+ ej ≺ Nmax and N − ei+ ej ∈
∑
k Fk. Suppose
that Ni ≤ Nj . Because we suppose that the k − 1-th largest value of N is strictly bigger than Nj ,
then ki > kj . We also suppose that ∀kj ≤ k ≤ ki, S(N, k) < S(Nmax, k). The k − 1-th largest
value of N is strictly bigger than Nj , so it is bigger than Nj + 1. Consequently, we have for all
1 ≤ l ≤ k− 1, S(N − ei + ej , l) = S(N, l) ≤ S(Nmax, l) (because N ≺ Nmax). Moreover, ∀kj ≤ k ≤
ki−1, S(N, k) < S(Nmax, k). Because the ki+1-th larger coordinate of N is strictly smaller than Ni,
then it is smaller than Ni+1 and we have S(N−e+ej , ki) = S(N, ki) ≤ S(Nmax, ki) and ∀l ≥ ki+1,
S(N − e+ej , l) = S(N, l) ≤ S(Nmax, l). Hence, N − ei + ej ≺ Nmax and N − ei + ej ∈
∑
k Fk.
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To solve the bilevel problem 5 in this specific case, we need to find u∗1 ∈ F1, . . . , u∗K ∈ FK such
that ψ(N∗) = −∑k〈ρk, u∗k〉. In Algorithm 2, such vectors (uk)∗ are found in the same time as N∗.
Then, to accelerate Algorithm 2, we need to be able to solve this problem rapidly. In particular, to
use a classical linear programming approach leads to a O((Kn)3,5) time complexity, which is not
acceptable. The problem to solve can be written:
Problem 6
max
u1,...,uK∈{0;1}n
∀k,∑ni=1 uk(i)=Rk
∀i,∑Kk=1 uk(i)=Ni
K∑
k=1
〈ρk, uk〉
We already mentioned in the proof of Theorem 7 that the constraints of this linear program
can be written 0 ≤ u ≤ 1, Au = b, where A is a totally unimodular matrix. Therefore, the value of
this problem is equal to the value of its continuous relaxation. Moreover, it can be interpreted as
a minimum cost flow problem (see [26, Ch. 12] for background). We define a bipartite graphs with
vertices i ∈ [n] and k ∈ [K], and edges between each i ∈ [n] and each k ∈ [K]. Each vertex i ∈ [n]
has an incoming flow equal to Ni, whereas each vertex k ∈ [K] has an outgoing flow equal to Rk.
Moreover, the capacity of each edge is 1, meaning that each flow uk(i) satisfies 0 ≤ uk(i) ≤ 1, and a
cost −ρk(i) is associated to each edge. Hence, the problem consists in finding the flow u minimizing
the total cost in this graph. Plenty of algorithms exist to solve such a problem. In our case, we have
K  n. According to Theorem 6, Algorithm 2 needs O(Rn2(K+n)) operations to solve Problem 5.
Notice that K ≤ R ≤ nK. Therefore, in order to accelerate Algorithm 2 in the studied case, we
need an algorithm solving the flow problem with a complexity depending on K in Kα with α < 2.
We can interpret the minimum cost flow problem as a minimum cost circulation problem, as
presented in [26, Ch. 12]. We introduce a sink t. We define an edge between each k ∈ [K] and t of
cost equal to 0, with a lower-bound for the flow equal to Rk and a capacity of Rk. We also define
an edge between t and each i ∈ [n] of cost equal to 0, with a lower-bound for the flow equal to N∗i
and a capacity of N∗i . Such a graph is represented on Figure 5.
Such a graph has |V | = K + n + 1 vertices and |E| = Kn + K + n edges. The sum of the
capacities of the different edges is 2R+Kn. In [13, Sec. 3.3], an algorithm is proposed to solve such
a problem. Different complexity bounds of such an algorithm are given in [13, Th. 3.5]. In the case
K  n, the optimal vectors u∗1, . . . , u∗K can be found in O((Kn)3/2 log((K + n)||ρ||∞)).
We can now write an algorithm for solving the bilevel problem in this specific case. We need
first to calculate Nmax =
∑n
r=0 prfr, where pr is defined as in the statement of Theorem 7, and
to find an initial point N ∈ ∑k Fk. We apply the same method as in Algorithm 1. In order to
calculate g(N − ei + ej) for each i, j ∈ [n], we sort the coordinate of N in the decreasing order,
and we use Lemma 10 to decide whether N − ei + ej ∈ Fk for all i, j. We use the same loop as in
Algorithm 1 to compute an N∗ such that g(N∗) is the maximal value of g over
∑
k Fk. Then, we
solve the minimum cost flow problem 6, as described previously, to find the optimal u∗k and then
we use Lemma 5 to determine an optimal y∗. It leads to Algorithm 3. The function Sort associates
to a vector x ∈ Rn a couple (y, ind), where y is a permutation of x such that y1 ≥ · · · ≥ yn and
ind is such that xi = yind(i) for each i ∈ [n]. The function S is defined by S(x, k) =
∑n
i=1 xi. The
functionMinCostF low associates to the different vectors (ρk)k∈[K] the vectors (u∗k)k∈[K] solving the
minimum cost flow problem 6. The functions f∗ and ShortestPath2 are defined as for Algorithm 2.
Theorem 8 Let us define ||ρ||∞ = maxk∈[K],i∈[n] |ρk(i)|, R =
∑
k Rk, for each k ∈ [K] nk =
n − #Jk and R =
∑
k Rk(nk − Rk). Algorithm 3 is correct and returns a global optimizer in
O(Rn2 + (Kn)3/2 log((K + n)||ρ||∞) +R+ n3) time and O(Kn+ n2) space.
26 Marianne Akian et al.
Algorithm 3 Solving the bilevel problem, in the case of majorization
Require: N ∈∑k Fk, Nmax, ρk, ∀k ∈ [K], f∗, S, Sort, MinCostF low, ShortestPath2, s ∈ [n]
Ensure: N∗ optimal number of customers, y∗ optimal discount vector
smax1 ← 0
for i = 1 to n do
smaxi ← smaxi +Nmaxi
end for
stop← 0
while stop = 0 do
(Nsort, ind)← Sort(N); s1 = 0
for i = 1 to n do
si ← si +Nsort(i)
for all j ∈ [n] do
if N(i) = 0 then
b(i, j)← 0
else
b(i, j)← 1
end if
end for
if si = smaxi then
for j = 1 to i do
b(ind(i), ind(j))← 0
end for
for j = i to n do
b(ind(j), ind(i))← 0
end for
end if
end for
gN ← f∗(N); g∗ ← maxu,v∈[n] b(u, v)f∗(N − eu + ev); i, j ∈ argmaxu,v∈[n] b(u, v)f∗(N − eu + ev)
if g∗ ≤ gN then
stop← 1
end if
end while
(u∗1, . . . , u
∗
K)←MinCostF low((ρk)k∈[K])
for all k ∈ [K] do
for all i, j /∈ Jk do
if u∗k(i) = 1 and u
∗
k(j) = 0 then
wkij ← ρk(i)− ρk(j)
end if
end for
end for
for all i, j ∈ [n] do
wij ← mink∈[K] wkij ; kij ∈ argmink∈[K] wkij
end for
M ← 1 + nmaxi,j∈[n] wij
for all t ∈ [n] do
if t 6= s AND wst = +∞ then
wst =M
end if
y∗ ← Shortestpath2(w, s)
y∗s ← 0
end for
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i = 1
i = 2
i = n
k = 1
k = 2
k = K
t
Fig. 5 Minimum cost flow problem transformed in a minimum cost circulation problem. The flow in the edges
between each i and k is in [0, 1], the flow in the edges between each k and t is equal to Rk, and the flow in the edges
between t and each i is N∗i .
Proof. According to Theorem 1, Theorem 7, Lemma 10 and Algorithm 1, this algorithm returns an
optimal solution N∗ of the high-level problem and an optimal discount vector y∗. Similarly as in the
proof of Algorithm 2, the number of calls of the "while" loop is bounded by R. The function Sort
needs O(n log(n)) time and space operations. O(n2) operations are needed to evaluate the vector
b, then the global time complexity of the "while" loop is O(Rn2) whereas the space complexity is
O(n2). Then, the optimal vectors u∗1, . . . , u∗K can be obtained in O((Kn)
3/2 log((K+n)||ρ||∞)) time
and O(Kn) space. By calculating only the finite values of wkij (which are not necessary stored here),
the number of operations needed to determine each wij and kij is O(R), with R =
∑
k Rk(nk−Rk)
and for each k ∈ [K], nk = n#Jk. We need only O(n2) space to store the values wij and kij . Finally,
the vector y∗ can be found by using the Ford-Bellman algorithm in a graph of n vertices and n2
edges, that is in time complexity of O(n3).
In the worst case, we have R = Kn and R = Kn2. Then, the time complexity of Algorithm 3 is
O(Kn3 + (Kn)3/2 log((K + n)||ρ||∞)) If the number of bits needed to write ||ρ||∞ is polynomial in
n and if K  n, then Algorithm 3 is faster than Algorithm 2. We finally notice that a minimum
cost flow problem is strongly polynomial time solvable, and it is then possible to adapt Algorithm 3
to return an optimal y∗ in strongly polynomial time. However, Algorithm 3 does not go faster than
Algorithm 2 in this case.
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6 The general algorithm
In this section, we come back to the general bilevel problem 2 proposed in Section 2, and ex-
tend Algorithm 2 to it. In the low level problem of each customer, the consumptions for differ-
ent contents verify the constraints ∀a ∈ [A] ,∑Tt=1 uak(t) = Rak, ∀t ∈ Iak , a ∈ [A] , uak(t) = 0 and
∀t ∈ [T ] ,∑a∈[A] uak(t) ≤ 1. We make the assumption that for each customer k, the sets of possible
instants at which this customer makes a request for the different applications are disjoint, meaning
that for any two applications a 6= a′, the complements of Iak and Ia
′
k in [T ] have an empty inter-
section. Then the constraint ∀t ∈ [T ] ,∑a∈[A] uak(t) ≤ 1 is automatically verified and the low-level
problem of each customer can be separated into different optimization problems corresponding to
the consumption vector uak of each customer k for each application a. Each of these problems takes
the following form:
Problem 7
max
uak∈{0,1}T
T∑
t=1
[
ρak(t) + α
a
ky
a,b(t, Lkt )
]
uak(t) (7)
s.t.
T∑
t=1
uak(t) = R
a
k, ∀t ∈ Iak , a ∈ [A] , uak(t) = 0 .
We denote by F ak the feasible set of this problem. The above assumption (that the complements
of Iak and Ia
′
k have an empty intersection) is relevant in particular if only one kind of application
is sensitive to price incentives. For instance, requests for downloading data can be anticipated (see
[29]) and it makes sense to assume that customers are only sensitive to incentives for this kind of
contents. In this case, the assumption means that customers wanting to download data can shift
their consumption only at instants when they do not request another kind of content.
Moreover, under this assumption, the decomposition theorem is still valid and Problem 2 can
be solved with the following method:
Theorem 9 (Decomposition (general case)) The bilevel problem 2 can be solved as follows:
1. Find an optimal solution (Na,b)∗ to the high level problem with unknown Na,b for each a ∈ [A],
b ∈ [B]:
Problem 8
max
Na,b∈∑k Fak
∑
t,l
∑
a∈[A]
∑
b∈[B]
γbN
a,b(t, l)sa,bl (N(t, l))

s.t. ∀t, l, N(t, l) =
∑
a∈[A]
∑
b∈[B]
Na,b(t, l) and ∀t, l, N(t, l) ≤ NCl .
2. For each a ∈ [A] and b ∈ [B], find vectors ((uak)∗)k∈Kb solutions of the following problem:
max
(uak∈Fak )k∈Kb∑
k∈Kb u
a
k=(N
a,b)∗
∑
k∈Kb
〈ρak, uak〉 .
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3. Find for each a ∈ [A] and b ∈ [B] a vector y∗a,b such that ∀k ∈ Kb,
(uak)
∗ ∈ arg max
uak∈Fak
〈ρak, uak〉
.
Proof. The different problems corresponding for each a ∈ [A], for each b ∈ [B] and for each k ∈ Kb
to Problem 7 are independent. Thus, according to Lemma 6, the global bilevel program consists in
solving Problem 8. Moreover, the optimal decomposition of (Na,b)∗ and the optimal price vector
(ya,b)∗ are totally independent for each a ∈ [A] and b ∈ [B]. Then, the proof of the last two parts
in the theorem is the same as in Theorem 1.
The last two parts of Theorem 9 are independent for each a ∈ [A] and b ∈ [B]. Thus, they
can be solved similarly as in the case of one kind of application and one kind of contracts, studied
in Section 3. We need to solve Problem 8. The function to optimize is separable (it can be writ-
ten as a sum of function depending only of one coordinate), but these functions are not concave
in (N1,1, . . . , NA,B) ∈ RnAB . However, because each function sa,bl is concave nonincreasing and
each Na,b(t, l) is positive, we notice that ∀a′ ∈ [A] , b′ ∈ [B], the function which sends Na′,b′(t, l)
to
∑
a∈[A]
∑
b∈[B] γbN
a,b(t, l)sa,bl (N(t, l)) is still concave. Consequently, the function to optimize in
Problem 8 isM -concave in each vectorNa,b ∈ ZT×L considered separately, the other one being fixed.
This leads to a block descent method, in which we use the same scheme as in Algorithm 1, succes-
sively, to maximize the objective function over every vector Na,b. We denote by f(N1,1, . . . , NA,B)
the objective function of the high-level problem. We consider for each a, b a vectorNa,b ∈∑k∈Kb F ak .
For each couple (a, b) taken successively, we find (ia,b, ja,b) belonging to:
argmax
(k,l) s.t. Na,b−ek+el∈
∑
k∈Kb F
a
k
f(N1,1, . . . , Na,b − ek + el, . . . , NA,B)
If f(N1,1 − ei1,1 + ej1,1 , . . . , NA,B − eiA,B + ejA,B ) ≤ f(N1,1, . . . , NA,B), then the algorithm stops
and returns (N1,1, . . . , NA,B). Otherwise, we take for each a, b, Na,b := Na,b−eia,b+eja,b and begin
again. Consequently, Algorithm 2 can be modified to solve the bilevel problem 6 in the general case.
It leads to Algorithm 4. The function GraphSearch, ShortestPath and ShortestPath2 are the
same as for Algorithm 2. The function f∗ is here defined by:
f∗ : (N1,1, . . . , NA,B) 7→
∑
t
∑
l
∑
a∈[A]
∑
b∈[B]
γbN
a,b(t, l)sa,bl (N(t, l))−M max(N(t, l)−NCl , 0)

with N(t, l) =
∑
a∈[A]
∑
b∈[B]N
a,b(t, l).
Because the objective function of Problem 8 is not M -convex in (N1,1, . . . , NA,B), we have
no guarantee of convergence of Algorithm 4 to a global optimal of the function f∗. However, we
can characterize the nature of the optimum returned by Algorithm 4. In order to estimate the
complexity of Algorithm 4, we define the function ∆f∗ by:
∆f∗(N1,1, . . . , NA,B) = −f∗(N1,1, . . . , NA,B)
+ max
ua,b,va,b∈[T ]×[L]
Na,b−e
ua,b
+e
va,b
∈∑k∈Kb Fak
f∗(N1,1 − eu1,1 + ev1,1 , . . . , NA,B − euA,B + evA,B )
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Algorithm 4 Solving the bilevel problem for an arbitrary number of types of contracts.
Require: (uak)
∗ ∈ Fak , ∀a ∈ [A] ,∀k ∈ [K], ρak, ∀a ∈ [A] ,∀k ∈ [K], f∗, GraphSearch, ShortestPath, ShortestPath2,
s ∈ [n]
Ensure: N∗ optimal number of customers, y∗ optimal discount vector
for all a ∈ [A] , b ∈ [B] do
Na,b ←∑k∈Kb (uak)∗
for all k ∈ Kb do
for all t, t′ /∈ Iak do
i = (t, Lk(t)) j = (t
′, Lk(t′)),
if uak(i) = 1 and u
a
k(j) = 0 then
wk,aij ← ρak(i)− ρak(j)
end if
end for
end for
for all t, t′ ∈ [T ], l, l′ ∈ [L] do
i = (t, l) j = (t′, l′)
wa,bij ← mink∈Kb wk,aij ; ka,bij ∈ argmink∈Kb wk,aij
end for
end for
stop← 0
while stop = 0 do
gN ← f∗(N1,1, . . . , NA,B);
for all a ∈ [A] , b ∈ [B] do
ca,b ← GraphSearch(wa,b)
g∗ ← maxu,v∈[T ]×[L] ca,buv f∗(N1,1, . . . , Na,b − eu + ev , . . . , NA,B); ia,b, ja,b ∈
argmaxu,v∈[T ]×[L] c
a,b
uv f
∗(N1,1, . . . , Na,b − eu + ev , . . . , NA,B)
end for
if g∗ ≤ gN then
stop← 1
else
for all a ∈ [A] , b ∈ [B] do
(v, path)← Shortestpath(wa,b, i, j); Na,b ← Na,b − eia,b + eja,b
for q = 1 to Length(path)− 1 do
α← path(q); β ← path(q + 1); k ← ka,bαβ ; (uak)∗(α) = 0; (uak)∗(β) = 1
for all γ /∈ J ak do
wk,aαγ ← +∞; wk,aγβ ← +∞
if (uak)
∗(γ) = 1 then
wk,aγα ← ρak(γ)− ρak(α)
else
wk,aβγ ← ρak(β)− ρak(γ)
end if
end for
end for
for all t, t′ ∈ [T ] , l, l′ ∈ [L] do
i = (t, l) j = (t′, l′)
wa,bij ← mink∈Kb wk,aij ; ka,bij ∈ argmink∈Kb wk,aij
end for
end for
end if
end while
M ← 1 +ABTLmaxi,j∈[T ]×[L],a∈[A],b∈[B] wa,bij
for all t ∈ [n] do
if t 6= s AND wst = +∞ then
wst =M
end if
y∗ ← Shortestpath2(w, s)
y∗s ← 0
end for
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If for each a, b we have ua,b = va,b, then ∆f∗(N1,1, . . . , NA,B) = 0. Thus, we have
∆f∗(N1,1, . . . , NA,B) ≥ 0
. Because the set
∏
a,b(
∑
k∈Kb F
a
k ) is finite, we can define the value δg by:
δg = min
Na,b∈∑k∈Kb Fak
∆f∗(N1,1,...,NA,B)>0
∆f∗(N1,1, . . . , NA,B)
because f∗ has not a constant value.
Theorem 10 Let us define γmax = maxb∈[B] γb. Let us also define R =
∑
a∈[A]
∑
k∈[K]R
a
k, for each
a ∈ [A] and k ∈ [K] nak = TL − #J ak (that is the number of possible non-zero coordinates of the
vectors of F ak ) and R =
∑
a
∑
k R
a
k(n
a
k −Rak). Algorithm 4 terminates in O(γmaxRδg (AB(TL)3 +R))
time and O(R) space, and returns vectors (ya,b)∗a∈[A],b∈[B] and (N
a,b)∗a∈[A],b∈[B] such that ∀a ∈
[A] , b ∈ [B] , ∀Na,b ∈∑k KbF ak :
f∗((N1,1)∗, . . . , (Na,b)∗, . . . , (NA,B)∗) ≥ f∗((N1,1)∗, . . . , Na,b, . . . , (NA,B)∗)
Proof. Algorithm 4 continues while the value g∗ is strictly larger than gN . Because the set
∏
a,b(
∑
k∈Kb F
a
k )
is finite, the algorithm terminates. When it stops, the vector (Na,b)a∈[A],b∈[B] is such that ∀a ∈
[A] , b ∈ [B] , ∀u, v ∈ [T ]× [L]:
f(N1,1, . . . , Na,b − eu + ev, . . . , NA,B) ≤ f(N1,1, . . . , Na,b, . . . , NA,B)
For each a, b, the function Na,b 7→ f(N1,1, . . . , Na,b, . . . , NA,B) is M -concave. The statement of
the theorem comes straightforwardly from the equivalence between local and global optimality for
M -concave functions.
Algorithm 4 differs from Algorithm 2 by the different applications and kind of contracts and by
the number of iterations of the loop. The set [K] of customers is split following the different kind
of contracts b ∈ [B]. Thus, we have to define the parameters wk,aij for each k ∈ [K] and a ∈ [A] and
the global space complexity becomes
∑
a
∑
k R
a
k(n
a
k − Rak) = R. The number of iterations of the
loop can be estimated with a pseudo-polynomial bound. The algorithm continues while g∗ > gN .
Then, the new value of g∗ is f∗(N1,1 − ei1,1 + ej1,1 , . . . , NA,B − eiA,B + ejA,B . Consequently, at
each iteration of the loop, the value of g∗ increases of at least δg until the algorithm stops. The
finite values of f∗ are nonnegative, and an upper bound is (maxb∈B γb)(
∑
a
∑
k∈[K]R
a
k) = γmaxR
because each function sl takes values between 0 and 1. In each loop, the number of operations is
O(R+AB(TL)3) to calculate the new values of wa,bij and to solve a shortest path problem for each
a and b in the graph Ga,b with nodes corresponding to all couples in [T ]× [L] and edges with values
wa,bij between vertices i, j ∈ [T ]× [L].
7 Experimental results
We consider an application based on real data provided by Orange. It involves the data consumptions
in an area of L = 43 cells, during one day divided in time slots of one hour, that is T = 24 time
slots. We will focus here our study on price incentives only for download contents. During this day, a
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number K of more than 2500 customers make some requests for downloading data in this area and
we are interested in balancing the number of active customers in the network. Even though they
are insensitive to price incentives, other kind of requests (web, mail, etc.) have to be satisfied and
they are taken into account in the high level optimization problem. We consider two classes of users:
standard and premium customers. The premium ones demand a better quality of service. Hence,
they are less satisfied than the standard customers if they share their cell with a given number of
active customers. We therefore define the satisfaction function as in Section 2. The provider wants to
favor the premium customers. Hence, we take γb = 2 for the latter ones and γb = 1 for the standard
customers, in the high-level optimization problem. We also assume that the premium customers are
less sensitive to the incentives, and thus take αak = 1/2 for all standard customers and α
a
k = 1 for
all premium customers in the low-level problem 1. We estimate very simply the parameters ρk. We
take ρk(t) = 1 when the customer k consumes download at time t without incentives, ρk(t) = 0
when he does not make any request without incentives but makes a request for download at times
t− 1 or t+ 1 (we assume he could shift his consumption of one hour) and ρk(t) = −∞ otherwise.
Fig. 6 Satisfaction of premium customers for streaming without (left) and with (right) incentives. The grey level
indicates the satisfaction: critical unsatisfaction, s < 0.3 (black), 0.3 < s < 0.7 (dark grey), 0.7 < s < 0.9 (grey),
0.9 < s < 0.99 (light grey) and complete satisfaction 0.99 < s (white).
We solve the bilevel problem using Algorithm 4, implemented in Scilab. The computation took
9526 seconds on a single core of an Intel i5-4690 processor @ 3.5 GHz.
On Figures 6– 9, we show the evolution of the satisfaction of different kind of customers for
different kind of contents without and with incentives. These results show that price incentives have
an effective influence on the load, especially in the most loaded cells (the number of black regions
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Fig. 7 Satisfaction of standard customers for streaming without (left) and with (right) incentives
in the space-time coordinates, in which the unsatisfaction of the users is critical, is considerably
reduced). Moreover, Figure 10 reveals that the consumption of users is not only moved in time, but
also in space: not only some consumption is moved from the peak hour to the night (off peak), but
the surface of the dark grey region, representing the total download consumption in the cell over
the whole day, is decreased, indicating that some part of the consumption has been shifted to other
cells.
8 Conclusion
We presented here a bilevel model for price incentives in data mobile networks. We solved this
problem by a decomposition method based on discrete convexity and tropical geometry. We finally
applied our results to real data. In further work, we shall consider more general models: unfixed
number of requests, nonlinear preferences of the customers, satisfaction functions of the provider
taking into account the profit. Stochastic models shall also be considered in particular to take into
account the partial information of the provider about the customers preferences and trajectories.
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Fig. 8 Satisfaction of premium customers for web, mail or download without (left) and with (right) incentives
References
1. Altman, E., Barman, D., El Azouzi, R., Ros, D., Tuffin, B.: Pricing differentiated services: A game-theoretic
approach. Computer Networks 50(7), 982–1002 (2006)
2. Baccelli, F., Cohen, G., Olsder, G., Quadrat, J.: Synchronization and Linearity. Wiley (1992)
3. Baldwin, E., Klemperer, P.: Tropical geometry to analyse demand. Tech. rep., Working paper, Oxford University
(2012)
4. Bellman, R.: On a routing problem. Quarterly of applied mathematics 16(1), 87–90 (1958)
5. Bonald, T., Feuillet, M.: Network performance analysis. John Wiley & Sons (2013)
6. Brotcorne, L., Labbé, M., Marcotte, P., Savard, G.: A bilevel model and solution algorithm for a freight tariff-
setting problem. Transportation Science 34(3), 289–302 (2000)
7. Butkovič, P.: Max-linear systems : theory and algorithms. Springer monographs in mathematics. Springer (2010)
8. Colson, B., Marcotte, P., Savard, G.: An overview of bilevel optimization. Annals of operations research 153(1),
235–256 (2007)
9. Danilov, V.I., Koshevoy, G.A.: Discrete convexity and unimodularity—i. Advances in Mathematics 189(2),
301–324 (2004)
10. Dempe, S.: Bilevel programming: A survey. Dekan der Fak. für Mathematik und Informatik (2003)
11. Eytard, J.B., Akian, M., Bouhtou, M., Gaubert, S.: A bilevel optimization model for load balancing in mobile
networks through price incentives. In: Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks
(WiOpt), 2017 15th International Symposium on, pp. 1–8. IEEE (2017)
12. Ford Jr, L.R.: Network flow theory. Tech. rep., RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA (1956)
13. Gabow, H.N., Tarjan, R.E.: Faster scaling algorithms for network problems. SIAM Journal on Computing 18(5),
1013–1036 (1989)
14. Ha, S., Sen, S., Joe-Wong, C., Im, Y., Chiang, M.: Tube: time-dependent pricing for mobile data. ACM SIG-
COMM Computer Communication Review 42(4), 247–258 (2012)
15. Itenberg, I., Mikhalkin, G., Shustin, E.I.: Tropical algebraic geometry, vol. 35. Springer Science & Business
Media (2009)
A bilevel optimization model for load balancing in mobile networks through price incentives 35
Fig. 9 Satisfaction of standard customers for web, mail or download without (left) and with (right) incentives
Fig. 10 Traffic in the most loaded cell. The light grey part represents the web, mail and streaming customers who
have no incentives and are fixed. The dark grey part corresponds to the download customers in the cell without (left)
and with (right) incentives
16. Lee, J.W., Mazumdar, R.R., Shroff, N.B.: Non-convex optimization and rate control for multi-class services in
the internet. IEEE/ACM transactions on networking 13(4), 827–840 (2005)
17. Ma, Q., Liu, Y.F., Huang, J.: Time and location aware mobile data pricing. In: Communications (ICC), 2014
IEEE International Conference on, pp. 3235–3240. IEEE (2014)
18. Maclagan, D., Sturmfels, B.: Introduction to Tropical Geometry, Graduate Studies in Mathematics, vol. 161.
American Mathematical Society, Providence, RI (2015)
19. Maillé, P., Tuffin, B.: Pricing the internet with multibid auctions. IEEE/ACM transactions on networking 14(5),
992–1004 (2006)
36 Marianne Akian et al.
20. Maillé, P., Tuffin, B.: Telecommunication network economics: from theory to applications. Cambridge University
Press (2014)
21. Moety, F., Bouhtou, M., En-Najjary, T., Nasri, R.: Joint optimization of user association and user satisfaction
in heterogeneous cellular network. In: 28th International Teletraffic Congress (2016)
22. Murota, K.: Discrete convex analysis. SIAM (2003)
23. Olkin, I., Marshall, A.W.: Inequalities: theory of majorization and its applications, vol. 143. Academic press
(1979)
24. Renegar, J.: A polynomial-time algorithm, based on newton’s method, for linear programming. Mathematical
Programming 40(1-3), 59–93 (1988)
25. Rockafellar, R.T.: Convex analysis. Princeton university press (1970)
26. Schrijver, A.: Combinatorial optimization: polyhedra and efficiency, vol. 24. Springer Science & Business Media
(2003)
27. Sen, S., Joe-Wong, C., Ha, S., Chiang, M.: A survey of smart data pricing: Past proposals, current plans, and
future trends. ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR) 46(2), 15 (2013)
28. Sen, S., Joe-Wong, C., Ha, S., Chiang, M.: Smart Data Pricing. John Wiley & Sons (2014)
29. Tadrous, J., Eryilmaz, A., El Gamal, H.: Pricing for demand shaping and proactive download in smart data
networks. In: INFOCOM, 2013 Proceedings IEEE, pp. 3189–3194. IEEE (2013)
30. Tran, N.M., Yu, J.: Product-mix auctions and tropical geometry. arXiv preprint arXiv:1505.05737 (2015)
